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C00006 00004	.cb Proposed Research
C00012 00005	.skip 200cb Appendix A - The 1979-80 Study on Philosphy and Artificial Intelligence
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.every heading();
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%5Computer Science Department
Stanford University

%3April 1979




%1Proposal to

%5National Science Foundation

%1for continuation of

%5Basic Research in Artificial Intelligence
.skip 2
John McCarthy
Professor of Computer Science
Principal Investigator
.skip 10;
%3Abstract
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.begin fill;
%1This is a request for continuation of NSF Grant MCS78-00524
supporting Basic Research in Artificial Intelligence.  The renewal will
continue for the second year the activities proposed for three years in
our proposal of April 26, 1978.  The amount requested is α$101,697,
in accordance with the budget submitted in the previous proposal, less
estimated carry-over of residual funds in the amount of α$45,193.
.end
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	During the academic year 1979-80, Professor John McCarthy
will be at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS)
at Stanford.  There he will take part as chairman in a study on
artificial intelligence and philosophy as part of a group of seven
computer scientists, philosophers and psychologists.
His work at CASBS will be precisely along the lines of the proposal
we are proposing to continue, and the grant will mainly
finance his participation.  The activities of the other participants,
though of course in accordance with their own scientific interests,
will contribute to solving the philosophical problems of formalizing
action and knowledge, which we have argued are fundamental for further
progress in artificial intelligence.  Appendix A describes the study
further.  Its objectives are not more fully prescribed than is expressed
in that appendix.

	McCarthy's personal research in that period will probably center
on non-monotonic reasoning and the further formalization of concepts.

	Non-monotonic reasoning, as described in the paper
%2Circumscription Induction - A Way of Jumping to Conclusions%1, is
increasingly seen as a requirement for AI systems.  Drew McDermott of Yale
and Jon Doyle of M.I.T.  recently wrote a paper on non-monotonic reasoning
proposing a different approach from McCarthy's.  An impromptu
mini-conference on non-monotonic reasoning was held at Stanford in
November 1978 and attracted 50 participants who heard papers by John
McCarthy, Drew McDermott, Terry Winograd and Richard Weyhrauch.  The
proceedings of the conference will be a special issue of the journal
%2Artificial Intelligence%1.

	The work on on non-monotonic reasoning will include comparing
circumscription with the McDermott approach and discussing how to
do non-monotonic reasoning in computational systems.  This may not
be easy, since none of the systems with the exception of pre-arranged
sets of default assumptions has any obvious implementation.

	2. Applying circumscription to proofs of non-knowledge
seems promising.

	McCarthy's approach to formalizing concepts has been further
pursued by McCarthy and also by Dr. Lew Creary, who has submitted
a paper to the 6th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence based on his improvement of the McCarthy formalism.

	Two papers based on this work have been accepted for publication.
%2Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines%1 in %3Philosophical Perspectives 
in Artificial Intelligence%1, Martin Ringle (ed.), N.Y., 1978, and
"First Order Theories of Individual Concepts and Propositions", in 
%2Machine Intelligence 9%1, Donald Michie (ed.), Scotland, 1979.
A third paper on representing recursive programs in first order theories was
also completed during the first year of the grant and will be
published in %2Proceedings of the International Conference on Mathematical
Studies of Information Processing%1, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan.

.skip 200;cb Appendix A - The 1979-80 Study on Philosphy and Artificial Intelligence

	The Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences located at
Stanford is arranging a group project at the Center for 1979-80 on the
general topic of artificial intelligence and philosophy.  The
interdisciplinary group begins with the premise that both artificial
intelligence and philosophy are concerned with intelligent behavior in
physical and biological systems.  Both face conceptual problems in
characterizing behavior.  On the philosophical side, Daniel Dennett, among
others, has characterized intentional systems which are physical systems
to which can be ascribed intentional qualities such as beliefs and wants.
On the artificial intelligence side, John McCarthy has indentified
conditions when mental qualities can be ascribed to machines.

	Artificial intelligence helps the philosopher, because intelligent
programs provide a domain where behavior is precisely defined but to which
one must ascribe some intellectual qualities if one is to describe what
one knows about its behavior.  For example, what a particular person knows
about the state of a particular computer operating system may be expressed
as ascribing to the program an incorrect belief that a certain user of the
system does not want to run his program.  From the artificial intelligence
point of view, a program that plans travel must know that travel agents
know airline schedules and must know that the gate at which a flight will
leave an intermediate stop is not knowable initially, but can easily be
discovered by an English-speaking traveller in the United States at the
time the information will be required.

	While no one expects to solve all the philosophical puzzles
concerning knowledge and wants in the near future, joint work by
philosophers and artificial intelligence people can identify and solve
some of the easier problems.  Sorting out the problems into easy and hard
will benefit both philosophy and artificial intelligence and facilitate
bridging the gap between the abstract world of philosophy and artificial
intelligence and practical real world problems of education and industry.
Cognitive psychology has already benefitted from the concreteness of
artificial intelligence systems and will also benefit from the
identification and solution of the more straightforward problems of
knowledge, wanting and obligation.

	The scientists who are currently scheduled to participate in this
group include:  Professor John McCarthy (Chairman), Computer Science,
Stanford University; Daniel Dennett, Philosophy, Tufts University; John
Haugeland, Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh; Patrick Hayes, Computer
Sciences, University of Essex; Marvin Minsky, Computer Science-Electrical
Engineering, M.I.T.; Robert Moore, Computer Science-Engineering, SRI
International; and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Psychology, University of Western
Ontario.